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COLLOQUIUM 
LAWYERING IN THE REGULATORY STATE 
FOREWORD 
Nancy J. Moore* 
INTRODUCTION 
In common parlance, the “regulatory state” refers to governance through 
specialized administrative agencies, such as the federal agencies that arose 
during the progressive era in the United States.1  Lawyering in the 
regulatory state takes a number of different forms, including the private 
representation of clients who are either litigating before agencies or facing 
compliance issues, as well as the public employment of lawyers within the 
agencies themselves.  Both types of regulatory lawyering raise a wide range 
of unique ethical issues for lawyers and are the subject of the articles in this 
Fordham colloquium entitled Lawyering in the Regulatory State.  These 
issues arise in the context of federal administrative agencies that we have 
heard much about, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the Patent and Trademark 
Office (PTO), lesser-known federal agencies, such as the National Highway 
Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA), the Consumer Products 
Safety Commission (CPSC), the Office of Disability Adjudication and 
Review (ODAR), and the Executive Office for Immigration Review, and a 
host of state agencies that “affect[] everyday life in countless ways.”2  The 
authors use a variety of methodologies, including traditional legal analysis, 
as well as empirical3 and historical4 research.  Finally, they focus on such 
 
*  Professor of Law and Nancy Barton Scholar, Boston University School of Law.  This 
Foreword provides an overview of the colloquium entitled Lawyering in the Regulatory State 
held at Fordham University School of Law. 
 
 1. See, e.g., J.E. ANDERSON, THE EMERGENCE OF THE REGULATORY STATE (1962); see 
also George M. Cohen, The Laws of Agency Lawyering, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1963 (2016). 
 2. Elizabeth Chambliss & Dana Remus, Nothing Could Be Finer?:  The Role of Agency 
General Counsel in North and South Carolina, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2040 (2016). 
 3. See id. at 2141 (“[The] account draws on interviews with current and former agency 
counsel, agency directors, and lawyers in the state Attorney General’s office, as well as 
roundtable discussions among agency counsel on topics of common interest.” (footnotes 
omitted)); David Hausman & Jayashri Srikantiah, Time, Due Process, and Representation:  
An Empirical and Legal Analysis of Continuances in Immigration Court, 84 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1823 (2016); Milton C. Regan, Jr. & Kath Hall, Lawyers in the Shadow of the 
Regulatory State:  Transnational Governance on Business and Human Rights, 84 FORDHAM 
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diverse issues as the role of agencies in facilitating access to justice,5 the 
lawyer’s role as gatekeeper in agency litigation6 and regulatory 
compliance,7 and the unique role of the in-house lawyer, both private8 and 
public.9  Taken together, they open a large window on the complex work of 
many lawyers who are often overlooked in the legal profession’s literature. 
I.  PRIVATE REGULATORY LAWYERS:  
ADVOCACY AND ADVISING 
The ethical conduct of private lawyers is often discussed in the context of 
the lawyer as an advocate in civil or criminal litigation10 or as an advisor to 
clients whose conduct pushes the limits of the law generally, including, 
without differentiation, common law, statutes, and administrative 
regulations.11  What largely has been ignored, however, are the special 
problems associated with litigating before administrative agencies, many of 
which have unique procedures,12 as well as the differing abilities of the 
various agencies to secure compliance with their particular regulatory 
regimes.  In this colloquium, two of the articles on private regulatory 
lawyering address the lawyer as litigator, whereas the remaining five 
articles focus on lawyers who advise clients on regulatory compliance 
issues. 
 
L. REV. 2001, 2002 (2016) (noting that the article “draw[s] on interviews with twenty-nine 
lawyers involved in the business and human rights field” (footnote omitted)). 
 4. See David McGowan, Lawyering Within the Domain of Expertise, 84 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1929, 1929 (2016) (“This Article uses the history of patent prosecution to assess the 
relationship between the practice of law and the claim of an administrative agency to possess 
and to employ expertise.”). 
 5. For example, Hausman and Srikantiah examine the relationship between the length 
of court continuances and the ability of immigrants and their families to obtain a private 
lawyer. See Hausman & Srikantiah, supra note 3. 
 6. See, e.g., infra notes 23–35 and accompanying text (discussing article by Milan 
Markovic that examines the lawyer’s potential role as gatekeeper in litigating Social Security 
Disability Insurance claims). 
 7. See, e.g., infra notes 39–45, 47–54 and accompanying text (discussing an article by 
Sung Hui Kim that defends her proposed reforms to enhance in-house lawyers’ role as 
gatekeepers to prevent harm to the securities markets); infra notes 46, 55–61 and 
accompanying text (discussing an article by Bernard W. Bell that examines the in-house 
lawyer’s potential role as gatekeeper in promoting compliance with product safety 
regulations). 
 8. See Bernard W. Bell, Recalling the Lawyers:  The NHTSA, GM, and the Chevrolet 
Cobalt, 84 FORDHAM L. REV 1899 (2016) (focusing on criticism of company’s in-house 
lawyers in recent corporate scandal); Sung Hui Kim, Inside Lawyers:  Friends or 
Gatekeepers?, 84 FORDHAM L. REV 1867 (2016). 
 9. See Chamblis & Remus, supra note 2. 
 10. See, e.g., STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS:  PROBLEMS OF LAW AND 
ETHICS 325–422 (9th ed. 2012). 
 11. See, e.g., 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 6.22 (4th 
ed. 2016) (discussing the prohibition against lawyers counseling or assisting unlawful 
conduct). 
 12. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 1 (discussing different regulatory regimes of different 
federal agencies). 
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In their article entitled Time, Due Process, and Representation:  An 
Empirical and Legal Analysis of Continuances in Immigration Court,13 
David Hausman and Jayashri Srikantiah examine the role of lawyers in 
administrative proceedings before immigration courts, which are overseen 
by the Executive Office for Immigration Review, an office within the U.S. 
Department of Justice.  The issue for them is not the ethical conduct of the 
immigrant family’s lawyer, but rather the proper role of these particular 
administrative courts in facilitating the ability of an immigrant family 
facing deportation to access justice through legal representation.14  Because 
the proceedings are civil rather than criminal, there is no currently 
recognized right to a government-funded lawyer for those who cannot 
afford one.15  According to the empirical research of Hausman and 
Srikantiah, only 14 percent of the immigrant families studied began their 
immigration proceedings with a lawyer; however, after the immigration 
judge advised them that they had a right to a lawyer at their own expense 
and offered them a continuance to find one, as many as 44 percent found a 
lawyer by the time of their second hearing.16  Moreover, “The more time 
they had between hearings, the more likely they were to find a lawyer.”17  
This time was necessary for them to either accumulate the money to pay a 
lawyer or locate a lawyer willing to represent them for free.18 
There is a consensus that immigration court judges must grant a 
continuance after the first hearing; however, current law does not specify 
the length of that continuance, and the practices of individual judges differ 
significantly.19  Hausman and Srikantiah demonstrate the problematic 
nature of this variability by first calculating the effect of having a lawyer on 
the likelihood of deportation.  Their research reveals a distinct pattern 
between the length of a continuance (between the first and second hearing) 
and eventual deportation.  This correlation peaks at approximately 100 
days,20 which is also the number of days making the most significant 
difference in the ability of immigrants to find representation.21  As a result 
of their research, they advocate a presumptive right to a ninety-day 
continuance after the first hearing.22 
 
 13. Hausman & Srikantiah, supra note 3. 
 14. Id. at 1835 (discussing “origins and contours of the right to a reasonable time [for 
immigrants facing deportation] to seek counsel”). 
 15. See id. at 1825 (discussing position of federal government that such immigrants have 
no right to a government-provided lawyer); id. at 1825 n.9 (providing funding for lawyers to 
represent unaccompanied children but not for lawyers to represent families with children 
facing deportation). 
 16. Id. at 1826. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 1827. 
 19. Id. at 1828. 
 20. See id. at 1832 fig.3. 
 21. Id. at 1830 (discussing Figure 2:  Continuance Length and Representation for 
Priority Docket Cases). 
 22. Id. at 1842–43. 
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In his article entitled Lawyers and the Secret Welfare State,23 Milan 
Markovic addresses an ethical problem that confronts lawyers litigating 
Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) claims before the federal 
federal Office of Disability Adjudication and Review24 (ODAR).  The issue 
is whether and when lawyers are required to disclose to ODAR judges the 
existence of evidence known to them that is adverse in some respect to their 
client’s claim of disability.25  As Markovic notes, SSDI processes are 
nonadversarial,26 the government is not represented in the hearings,27 and 
Model Rule 3.3(d) of the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct requires lawyers in ex parte proceedings to “inform 
the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer that will enable the 
tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are 
adverse.”28  Although one state bar has opined that this rule applies to SSDI 
proceedings,29 another state bar opinion concludes that SSDI proceedings 
are not ex parte because ODAR judges have the ability to develop the 
record.30  There have been efforts to amend the Social Security Act to 
require expressly the production of unfavorable evidence, but these efforts 
were defeated, largely as the result of efforts of the organized bar.31  
Markovic decries these efforts, pointing to the contrary posture of the 
organized tax bar, which “largely supported legislative and regulatory 
efforts that formalized tax lawyers’ gatekeeping responsibilities” in the 
context of tax shelters.32 
After developing an argument that distributive justice requires that 
lawyers seeking public benefits for their clients act as gatekeepers by 
refusing to pursue illegitimate client interests,33 Markovic addresses the 
question of how this result can be achieved, given the opposition of the 
organized bar.  He proposes that the Social Security Administration (SSA) 
“require lawyers to certify that, based on their review of the relevant client 
materials, there is a reasonable basis to believe that their clients qualify for 
benefits.”34  Concerned, however, that the agency might not have the 
statutory authority to regulate lawyers in this manner, Markovic also 
proposes that the SSA provide for voluntary certification, which could 
benefit clients through “expedited and less exacting review.”35 
 
 23. Milan Markovic, Lawyers and the Secret Welfare State, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1845 
(2016). 
 24. He also address Medicaid planning, id. at 1847, but the emphasis in the article is on 
litigating SSDI claims. 
 25. Id. at 1848. 
 26. Id. at 1847. 
 27. Id. at 1850. 
 28. Id. (citing and quoting ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(d) (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 2013)). 
 29. Id. at 1850 & n.40 (citing Ala. Bar Ass’n Disciplinary Comm’n, Op. RO-93-06 
(1993)). 
 30. Id. (citing N.C. State Bar, 98 Formal Ethics Op. 1 (1999)). 
 31. Id. 1851. 
 32. Id. at 1861 (footnote omitted). 
 33. Id. at 1859. 
 34. Id. at 1862. 
 35. Id. at 1863. 
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The concept of the lawyer as “gatekeeper” is more commonly invoked in 
discussions of the role of the private lawyer as advisor to clients in 
situations where the lawyer knows or arguably should know that the client’s 
conduct may be unlawful.36  In the wake of Enron and other corporate 
scandals, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), pursuant 
to which the SEC adopted regulations requiring lawyers who “appear and 
practice” before the SEC to report credible evidence of corporate violations 
up the ladder, all the way to the board of directors.37  Two of the 
contributors to this colloquium invoke a more recent scandal involving 
General Motors Company (GM) to reassess federal agency regulation of 
lawyers for companies like GM.38 
In 2014, after many years of delay, GM finally recalled 2.6 million 
vehicles with a defective ignition switch, which by June 2015 had caused 
hundreds of deaths and many more serious injuries.39  A report 
commissioned by GM’s board concluded that GM’s in-house lawyers 
knew, as early as 2005, that GM’s Cobalt had a tendency to stall while in 
motion and learned in 2007 that the defective switch had been linked to an 
air bag failure.40  In 2010, the lawyers apparently understood that the 
Cobalt had a history of airbag deployments and had been warned by GM’s 
outside products liability lawyers that GM could be subjected to punitive 
damages for its inaction.41  Nevertheless, these in-house lawyers failed to 
inform GM’s general counsel of the potential need for a recall until 
December 2013.42  In 2014, four of GM’s in-house lawyers were 
terminated, and the General Counsel announced his resignation.43 
Our two contributors confront the GM scandal from two different 
regulatory perspectives.  Sung Hui Kim reiterates her previous criticism of 
the SEC regulations adopted pursuant to SOX44 as inadequate to address 
harm to the securities markets as a result of “inside lawyer acquiescence in 
corporate fraud.”45  Bernard Bell is less concerned with preventing harm to 
corporate shareholders and investors than he is with the need to promote 
compliance with product safety regulations designed to protect the public 
from serious harm caused by defective products such as GM’s Cobalt.46 
 
 36. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 8, at 1869 (discussing a previous article in which Kim 
defined a “gatekeeper” as a “private intermediar[y] who can prevent harm to the securities 
markets by disrupting the misconduct of [his or her] client representatives” (quoting Sung 
Hui Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411, 413 (2008))). 
 37. See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton et al., Legal and Ethical Duties of Lawyers After 
Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L. REV. 725, 727–28, 740 (2004). 
 38. See infra notes 39–61 and accompanying text. 
 39. See Kim, supra note 8, at 1867. 
 40. Id. at 1868. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. 17 C.F.R. § 205.1–.7 (2015). 
 45. See Kim, supra note 8, at 1869.  Kim wrote a series of articles promoting the in-
house lawyer’s role as gatekeeper, beginning with a 2005 article. See Sung Hui Kim, The 
Banality of Fraud:  Re-situating the Inside Counsel As Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 
983 (2005).  For a discussion of Kim’s critique of the SOX regulations, see id. at 1034–52. 
 46. See Bell, supra note 8. 
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In her article entitled Inside Lawyers:  Friends or Gatekeepers?, Kim 
responds to a critic of an earlier article where she analyzed the “ethical 
ecology” of in-house counsel, in which multiple roles “unleash 
psychological pressures that strongly affect the actions and choices of 
inside lawyers,” leading them to “turn a blind eye to unethical corporate 
behavior.”47  Kim believed that the SOX regulations were inadequate to 
address this problem and thus proposed an alternative reform in which:  (1)  
a committee of independent board members would oversee the corporate 
legal department; (2)  inside counsel would be guaranteed whistleblower 
protection for any claim alleging retaliation; and (3)  public companies 
would either limit the amount of equity investments an in-house lawyer 
could accept as compensation or otherwise minimize the potential for 
conflicts of interest arising from such compensation.48  Lawrence 
Hamermesh criticized this proposal as “radical” and cautioned that direct 
board oversight would cause general counsel to lose access to information 
they would otherwise receive through informal communications with senior 
managers.49  Hamermesh responded with his own less-radical proposals 
designed to encourage general counsels’ independence without sacrificing 
the trust of senior managers.50 
In her current article, Kim defends her earlier proposals, arguing that 
Hamermesh’s alternative reforms do nothing to address “the structural 
forces likely to lead inside lawyers to succumb to psychological pressures 
in their multiple roles.”51  Conceding that it is at least plausible that her 
proposed reforms might reduce the level of informal communication 
between general counsel and senior managers, Kim argues that there are 
numerous other sources of information, and, in any event, the likely 
benefits of her proposals outweigh the potential costs.52  She concludes by 
contrasting her vision of “lawyer as gatekeeper” with Hamermesh’s vision 
of “lawyer as friend,”53 an image that featured prominently in a 
controversial article authored by Charles Fried that has been the subject of 
much criticism.54 
In his article entitled Recalling the Lawyers:  The NHTSA, GM, and the 
Chevrolet Cobalt, Bell observes that the lawyer’s role as gatekeeper in the 
context of the SEC’s newly enacted SOX regulations is not necessarily 
inconsistent with the lawyer’s loyalty to clients because the goal of these 
regulations is to counteract the corporate lawyer’s natural inclination “to 
pursue management’s interests at other constituencies’ expense.”55  With 
 
 47. Kim supra note 8, at 1871. 
 48. Id. at 1871–72. 
 49. Id. at 1869–70 (discussing Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Who Let You Into the House?, 
2012 WIS. L. REV. 359). 
 50. Id. at 1888. 
 51. Id. at 1875 (footnote omitted). 
 52. Id. at 1883. 
 53. Id. at 1887–95. 
 54. Id. at 1888–89 (discussing Charles Fried, The Lawyer As Friend:  The Moral 
Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976)). 
 55. Bell, supra note 8, at 1900 (footnote omitted). 
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respect to nonsecurities lawyers, however, there is less of an identity 
between the lawyer’s client and regulatory beneficiaries, and yet “the 
physical harms that may befall consumers [of defective products] are far 
more serious than the financial losses shareholders typically suffer.”56  Bell 
then uses GM’s response to the Cobalt ignition switch defect as a case study 
to examine the question of whether it is legal and prudent for a regulatory 
agency to impose gatekeeping responsibilities on such counsel.57 
In recounting the actions of GM’s in-house and outside counsel, Bell 
notes that, in contrast to the role of lawyers in SEC filings, neither set of 
GM lawyers played a significant role in disclosures GM made to NHTSA.58  
In-house lawyers were informed by outside products liability litigators of 
the extent of the defect problem, and these in-house lawyers clearly took far 
too long in responding to these concerns.59  However, Bell is not convinced 
that the appropriate regulatory response is for product safety agencies to 
regulate the conduct of lawyers.  He questions the authority of these 
agencies to enact such regulations, distinguishing them from the SEC, 
which acted pursuant to authorization in the text of SOX, and further noting 
that the GM lawyers did not “practice” before NHTSA, nor were they 
involved in any “agency proceedings.”60  More importantly, he questions 
whether it would be prudent for such agencies to attempt to make lawyers 
serve as gatekeepers in the product safety context, arguing that they lack the 
expertise to resolve controversial ethics issues and that there are alternative 
ways of increasing company compliance; for example, by enacting 
whistleblower bounties or by requiring the companies to obtain a lawyer’s 
certification before taking certain actions.61 
David McGowan is also concerned with the differing types of 
relationships between lawyers and particular administrative agencies.  In his 
article entitled Lawyering Within the Domain of Expertise, McGowan 
focuses on the PTO and then “uses the history of patent prosecution to 
assess the relationship between the practice of law and the claim of an 
administrative agency to possess and to employ expertise.”62  His thesis is 
that “where an agency claims expertise, that claim will lead it to give 
lawyers appearing before it less leeway than lawyers generally have.”63 
McGowan’s historical review of patent prosecutions portrays the PTO as 
swinging back and forth between claims of agency expertise, under which 
the PTO would engage in a rigorous examination of a patent claim,64 and a 
preference of “legal over technical expertise,”65 in which the PTO would 
grant patent requests liberally and defer to courts the adjudication of 
 
 56. Id. at 1901. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 1903. 
 59. Id. at 1904–11. 
 60. Id. at 1914. 
 61. Id. at 1918–27. 
 62. McGowan, supra note 4, at 1929. 
 63. Id. at 1929–30. 
 64. See id. at 1931–33. 
 65. Id. at 1943. 
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disputes between patent holders and their challengers.66  He demonstrates 
how lawyers were ambivalent but generally sided with the liberal grant of 
patents, not only because their inventor-clients preferred that regime, but 
also because it permitted the lawyers to earn large contingent fees in patent 
litigation and to exercise their “tradecraft.”67  In response to numerous 
abuses of the liberal regime, in which lawyers played a significant role, the 
PTO reasserted its own expertise, culminating in the adoption of agency 
rules designed to prohibit “fraud and inequitable conduct” by applicants and 
their agents, including lawyers.68  He concludes that “[t]hough there are 
many justifications for regulation [of lawyers], an agency’s claim of 
disinterested expertise will tend to produce stricter rules on lawyers’ 
behavior than would be found absent that claim.”69 
Unlike the previous authors, George M. Cohen takes a comprehensive 
approach to the “teeming variety of agency rules governing lawyers.”70  In 
his article entitled The Laws of Agency Lawyering, Cohen takes a close look 
at forty-six federal agencies with rules governing practice before these 
agencies.71  He catalogues the different approaches they take and then seeks 
to determine if there is a rational basis for these differences. 
Cohen begins by examining the rather cursory treatment of private 
agency lawyering under the ABA Model Rules, concluding that these rules 
leave a number of unresolved questions, including the extent to which 
violating an agency rule subjects a lawyer to discipline under state ethics 
standards.72  He then turns to potential explanations and justifications for 
federal agency rules regulating the conduct of lawyers, including the 
following candidates:  (1)  specialized rules tailored to specific agency 
practices; (2)  rules that unify practice before agencies generally; (3)  
uniform rules for lawyers and nonlawyers practicing before an agency; (4)  
inadequate enforcement of state ethics rules; (5)  multijurisdictional practice 
issues; (6)  private lawyer interests; (7)  experimentation in lawyer 
regulation; and (8)  agency history and experience.73 
In the remainder of the article, Cohen demonstrates detailed differences 
among the lawyer conduct rules of the forty-six federal agencies he 
examined, exploring variations with respect to the identification, format and 
scope of such rules, as well variations in their content.74  He then analyzes 
the extent to which these rules reflect the various justifications for agency 
regulation.  Noting that no “one explanation predominate[s]” over the 
others,75 he provides examples of agency regulations reflecting each 
proposed justification, concluding that “[d]ifferent theories better explain 
 
 66. See id. at 1938–48. 
 67. Id. at 1955. 
 68. Id. at 1953. 
 69. Id. at 1955. 
 70. Cohen, supra note 1, at 1964. 
 71. Id. app. A. 
 72. Id. at 1965–72. 
 73. Id. at 1972–78. 
 74. Id. at 1978–89. 
 75. Id. at 1981. 
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rules in different agencies, though the reason for the differences between 
agencies is not always apparent.”76 
Thus far, our colloquium contributors addressed private regulatory 
lawyering in the context of administrative agencies within the federal 
government of the United States.  Milton C. Regan, Jr. and Kath Hall 
expand the concept of private regulatory lawyering to consider the role of 
lawyers for multinational companies in respecting human rights.  In their 
article entitled Lawyers in the Shadow of the Regulatory State:  
Transnational Governance on Business and Human Rights, they describe 
the challenges posed by the rise of what they call “a system of transnational 
‘governance.’”77  Obviously, there is no international or transnational 
“state” that is the equivalent of the nation state; therefore, by “governance” 
they mean to “incorporate[] the network of actors, instruments, and 
mechanisms that to varying degrees regulate transnational corporations 
apart from formally authoritative state laws.”78  Looking to actors such as 
“international organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
industry and professional organizations and private sector providers,” the 
authors examine “regulatory instruments” that include both legally binding 
“hard law” and informal “soft law,” which is meant to influence conduct in 
a more informal manner such as through financial or reputational 
sanctions.79 
After describing in some detail the protection afforded human rights 
under this system of “transnational ‘governance,’”80 Regan and Hall begin 
to examine the role of lawyers within this system.81  They do so through 
interviews with twenty-nine lawyers who are involved in advising 
businesses on human rights either as inside or outside counsel or are 
employed in organizations that play a role in this field.82  The authors 
identify various factors found to influence these lawyers’ provision of 
human rights advice, including the binding or nonbinding nature of the 
relevant human rights obligations, the ability to frame human rights issues 
to appeal to client interests, and the relationship between outside and inside 
counsel.83  They conclude that the most effective means of communicating 
with clients consists of what they call “the risk management lexicon,” 
including the risk of legal liability, the legal risks of nonbinding standards 
that are likely to become “hard law,” and business risk, including harm to 
the company’s reputation.84  Regan and Hall conclude by observing that 
there is clearly a significant role for lawyers to play in this emerging system 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. Regan & Hall, supra note 3, at 2001. 
 78. Id. at 2001–02 (footnote omitted). 
 79. Id. at 2002. 
 80. Id. at 2003–20. 
 81. Id. at 2020–30. 
 82. Of the twenty-nine persons interviewed, two were senior lawyers in corporate legal 
departments, thirteen practiced at law firms, and fourteen worked for organizations that 
focus on business and human rights. Id. at 2020. 
 83. Id. at 2020–21. 
 84. Id. at 2024–30. 
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of transnational governance, but that it remains to be seen whether and how 
various lawyers will be willing to confront a system that “challenge[s] 
conventional understandings of what constitutes law and regulation.”85 
II.  PUBLIC REGULATORY LAWYERS 
Our three contributions on public regulatory lawyering examine 
strikingly different aspects of the professional lives of these lawyers.  The 
first set of authors, Elizabeth Chambliss and Dana Remus, use empirical 
research to explore the counseling function of state agency lawyers, 
including the extent to which they actually shape agency policy and 
practice.86  Daniel J. Bussel focuses on the government lawyer’s role as a 
third-party neutral when serving as an inquisitorial bankruptcy examiner 
under the supervision of federal bankruptcy judges.87  Finally, Renee 
Newman Knake explores the First Amendment rights of agency lawyers 
when they are engaged in a unique type of activity she describes as 
“assessment of the workplace.”88 
In their article entitled Nothing Could Be Finer?:  The Role of Agency 
General Counsel in North and South Carolina, Chambliss and Remus note 
that there has been considerable scholarship on the litigation role of state 
attorneys general, but very little on the role of state attorneys in counseling 
the agencies they work for.89  The counseling function is important because 
these agency lawyers “provide day-to-day, front-end advice about a wide 
range of issues,” including the “interpretation of statutes and regulations 
[that] may significantly shape formal law,” much of which is never 
reviewed.90 
Drawing on interviews and roundtable discussions with lawyers who 
have served in North or South Carolina as either current or former agency 
counsel, agency directors, or employees with the state attorney general, 
Chambliss and Remus examine “the structural evolution of the agency 
general counsel position and the functional division between in-house 
agency counsel and the Attorney General’s office,” as well as “the 
characteristics and career paths of lawyers who serve as agency general 
counsel” and the various “sources of authority in their roles.”91  They 
discovered that agency general counsel are generalists, not specialists,92 and 
that they are “relatively insulated from both hierarchical and political 
pressure.”93  The coauthors conclude with observations on the limits of 
their sample and identification of a future research agenda, including 
expanding the sample to include former agency counsel and lawyers below 
 
 85. Id. at 2037. 
 86. Chambliss & Remus, supra note 2. 
 87. Daniel J. Bussel, Ethics for Examiners, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2073 (2016). 
 88. Renee Newman Knake, Lawyer Speech in the Regulatory State, 84 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2099, 2101 (2016). 
 89. Chambliss & Remus, supra note 2, at 2039–40. 
 90. Id. at 2040. 
 91. Id. at 2041. 
 92. Id. at 2056–57. 
 93. Id. at 2058. 
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the rank of agency counsel and examining the likelihood that further 
developing organized networks will “promote the development of shared 
professional norms and enhance agency counsels’ authority.”94 
Bussel’s contribution, an article entitled Ethics for Examiners, builds on 
his prior scholarship95 on bankruptcy examiners who have recently begun 
to employ “inquisitorial”—that is, nonadversarial—methods of 
investigation in large Chapter 11 reorganizations.96  These methods differ 
from those employed by trustees or creditors’ committees, who, unlike 
examiners, are not neutrals.97  Avoiding adversarial investigation and 
litigation has many advantages, including efficiency and more accurate fact-
finding, but there are also costs, primarily the potential abuse of power by 
the examiners themselves.98  To the extent they are regulated at all, 
inquisitorial examiners are supervised by the appointing bankruptcy court 
on an ad hoc basis.99  Bussel’s article explores the possibility of regulating 
these examiners through binding codes of ethical conduct.100 
Bussel begins by noting significant differences between the role of an 
inquisitorial examiner and possible analogous positions, such as prosecutor, 
judge, or mediator, concluding that these examiners are “sui generis” and 
face “unique ethical quandaries and considerations.”101  He then describes 
in some detail the work of an inquisitorial examiner, using three recent 
cases he has discussed in his prior work.102  After identifying the ethical 
framework in which such examiners work, including the important ways in 
which their role differs from other lawyers and judges,103 Bussel addresses 
specific ethical issues:  due process values; deposing witnesses and ex parte 
contacts; privileges; duties to the process and the public (including 
independent judgment, transparency, efficiency, minimizing threats to 
reorganization, overzealousness); and maintaining impartiality (for 
example, by avoiding conflicts of interest and declining to combine 
investigation with mediation).104  His tentative suggestions with respect to 
each issue reflect his overall assessment of the particular nature of the 
inquisitorial examiner’s role, which is often akin to the judicial role but 
with some important exceptions, such as the need for access to privileged 
material of the debtor.105 
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Knake, who has previously argued in favor of strong First Amendment 
protection for attorney advice and advocacy,106 builds on that prior work in 
her article entitled Lawyer Speech in the Regulatory State.107  In this article, 
she joins other scholars who have criticized “two highly controversial split 
decisions from the Supreme Court ascribing minimal First Amendment 
protection to government lawyer speech—Connick v. Meyers and Garcetti 
v. Ceballos.”108  Her criticism is unique, however, in her focus on “the 
significance of workplace assessment speech by lawyers in the context of 
the regulatory state [which] has escaped the attention of commentators and 
courts.”109 
She begins by situating the two most recent Supreme Court cases within 
a prior history of cases addressing the ability of government employers to 
regulate the speech of their employees.  Prior to Connick and Garcetti, the 
Court was protective of the government’s role as employer, but carved out 
an exception for employee speech relating to matters of public concern that 
did not interfere with the efficient operation of the public employer.110  In 
these two recent cases, however, Knake argues that the Court’s majority set 
an unduly high bar for what constitutes matters of “public concern”111 and 
further required that the employee speak as a private individual in order to 
receive First Amendment protection.112  Both cases involved agency 
lawyers, and as Knake observes, whistleblowing is arguably “a fundamental 
aspect of the role of a lawyer, where professional obligations require a 
fidelity to the democratic process and rule of law.”113  She concludes by 
arguing that government lawyers, who are in a unique position to check 
agency misconduct, deserve heightened protection when they exercise 
“their professional judgment in deciding whether to engage in information 
providing, watchdogging, or whistleblowing functions.”114 
CONCLUSION 
Taken together, these colloquium articles confront issues of great interest 
to the legal profession.  Whether they are addressing the ethical issues 
facing private regulatory lawyers or the special concerns of public 
regulatory lawyers, they identify questions that are relevant to the work of 
an increasing number of lawyers.  These lawyers, who have been largely 
overlooked by the more traditional professional responsibility literature, 
will find much to learn in the pages of this highly informative and thought-
provoking colloquium. 
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